More Than 90 Percent of ARSA and RSO’s 10,000 Militants Are Refugees inside Bangladesh: Research Report

News Analysis ၊ September 5, 2026

ARSA and RSO Islamic Militant inside Bangladesh (photocrd)

The numbers tell a story that is hard to dismiss. When a research report claims that more than 90 percent of the 10,000 militants belonging to ARSA and RSO are living inside refugee camps in Bangladesh, it moves the debate from speculation to a measurable reality. This is not a minor detail. It is a structural flaw in how the humanitarian crisis along the border has been managed. For years, the world has focused on the plight of the displaced, and rightly so. But compassion without scrutiny becomes a shield for those who do not deserve it.

There are two ways to read Dhaka’s position on this matter. The official line is one of denial. Government representatives and their supporters insist that no Islamist militants operate from within the camps or elsewhere in Bangladeshi territory. They point to bureaucratic controls and registration systems. Yet this claim collapses under the weight of repeated and tangible evidence that emerges from the ground.

The second reading is less forgiving. It suggests that Bangladesh has, for a long time, followed a de facto policy of toleration, if not active encouragement. This toleration is born not from strategic calculation alone, but from a sense of religious kinship. When the authorities look the other way, they are not merely being negligent. They are signalling sympathy. The militants did not appear overnight. They were nurtured. They grew in numbers and capability while operating under a shadow of known toleration. That is not an accusation. It is a conclusion drawn from observable patterns.

The numbers from the Myanmar junta add another layer. In a recent statement, they claimed that out of the massive displacement in 2017, only a small fraction (only 3 lakhs) were verified as former residents, while over four thousand were linked to terrorist activities. That figure seemed low to some, but the independent research from Break-Forward-Burma Foused gives it credibility. Their video analysis breaks down the militant structure. ARSA and RSO each maintain more than five thousand trained members.

The critical detail is that ninety percent of these fighters are not hiding in remote jungles or crossing borders stealthily. They are living inside the refugee camps. The researcher does not reveal his sources, but the alignment with later events is telling. In 2024, when militant elements crossed into northern Arakan to confront the Arakan Army, the scale matched the prediction. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, a respected global voice, corroborated the figure. At least five thousand fighters were involved in that wave of violence. When independent and international sources converge, the denial becomes unsustainable.

This brings us to the core complication. Border security and refugee repatriation cannot be separated from this reality. The camps were meant to be temporary shelters, not training grounds. But when militant activity spills across the border, targeting innocent civilians and disrupting humanitarian aid, the entire process of return is poisoned. Aid workers face distrust. Local populations along the border grow fearful. The cycle of violence feeds on itself. Repatriation cannot succeed if it is not concrete and secure. Every criminal and militant must be removed from the equation. Without that, the return is not a solution, but a trap.

Beyond the immediate security threat, there is a deeper concern. The rise of Islamic radicalism within Bangladesh’s body politics is not a fringe issue. It is seeping into foreign policy orientation. That shift is dangerous, not just for Myanmar, but for the entire region. The tolerance of militancy in one corner eventually disturbs the peace of the whole neighbourhood. The report is a warning. It should be read as one.