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Investigations Reveal How the Myanmar Junta's Drug Allegations Against the Arakan Army Are Politically Motivated
- globalarakannetwork
- Oct 9
- 9 min read
Updated: Oct 11
Trend Analysis
Global Arakan Network October 10, 2025
On October 7, 2025, the Myanmar junta's news mouthpiece released a fresh drug allegation against the Arakan Army, claiming that "the terrorist group AA was caught in Yangon with drugs worth over 195 billion kyats intended for transport to Rakhine State and Malaysia."
As usual, the battle-losing, fascist junta provided no evidence beyond allegations and speculations propagated by their controlled newspaper. This is not the first time the junta, unable to defeat the AA on the battlefield, has cunningly attempted to set a political trap for the AA and its allies. Observations indicate a systematic pattern of such efforts in recent years.
On August 29 and 30, 2025, the junta’s webpage of the Ministry of Information and its propaganda media, Myawaddy, released a story as Part-1 and Part-2 alleging AA of involving in drug trade and human rights violations against the Muslims in northern Arakan. The story is titled as “The Drug Trafficking Network and Terrorism Threat of the Terrorist AA Group” invented by anonymous name of Aung Shinn to intentionally vilify AA or shift blame AA for these crimes that they have committed for years.
According to Aung Shinn’s stories, it is mentioned that;
“From 2016 to 21 July 2025, there were 24 instances of seizures of narcotics and weapons/ammunition involving members of the AA terrorist insurgent group. During the incidents, 276 drug-related offenders were arrested, together with over 14.4 million methamphetamine pills, over 11.9 tonnes of ICE (crystal meth), 800 kg of caffeine, 2.2 tonnes of Ketamine, with a total estimated value of over 266 billion Kyats (over USD 73.9 million).”
He continued that of 24 narcotics seizures involving AA group members, 9 apparent narcotics seizures involving AA top leaders themselves will be highlighted.
The case he has highlighted are as follows;
As noted above, although author Aung Shinn claims to have listed nine prominent drug allegations against the Arakan Army (AA), he has in fact covered only six—not nine—highlighting a lack of consistency and accuracy in his reporting. Furthermore, upon closer examination, his allegations lack hard evidence to prove that AA leaders or officials are linked to these activities.
The Myanmar junta relies on only two types of evidence to accuse the AA: materials and men.
Regarding material evidence, it is unreasonable to assume that seized drugs originate from the AA. As many sources confirm, drug production in Myanmar typically occurs in junta or its proxy forces-controlled areas near the Chinese and Thai borders, where raw materials are easily accessible.
Indeed, with backing from junta officials, many proxy militias, Border Guard Forces, or ceasefire signatory ethnic armed groups enjoy logistical and personal privileges. Therefore, alleging ULA/AA involvement based solely on drug materials is illogical. Moreover, the presence of AA uniforms or bands alongside drug materials appears to be nothing more than propaganda as someone can easily do it.
The second type of evidence involves individuals connected to drug seizures. To make their narratives seem credible, the junta often uses “ethnic Rakhine men or women” to establish a link to the AA. At times, they also reference the names of AA officials or soldiers allegedly identified by their intelligence forces.
However, a more logical explanation exists. Individual ethnic Rakhines have often engaged in drug trafficking due to widespread poverty and a lack of rule of law, a situation persisting since the U Thein Sein administration (2011–2015)—a period before the ULA/AA began large-scale military operations in Rakhine State.
Additionally, Myanmar authorities, known for high levels of bribery and corruption, have been known to secretly coordinate with Rakhine drug traffickers. When facing pressure from higher authorities or dissatisfaction with these arrangements, they easily arrest these individuals and label them as “AA members.” While these allegations are simple to make, providing tangible evidence to support their claims remains difficult.
Therefore, neither the material evidence nor the individuals presented in junta reports credibly prove ULA/AA involvement in drug trafficking.
Another interesting finding emerges upon careful observation: the junta’s allegations appear to be politically and militarily motivated. The timing of these accusations is revealing; it is strikingly evident that the more military pressure or losses the junta faces from the AA, the more frequently they invent such drug-related stories.
For example, please refer to incident (5) in the table above, which occurred on July 8, 2025. The junta alleged that the AA was sponsoring the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) in drug trafficking. This story represents both an embarrassing effort and a dangerous political plot to discredit the AA domestically and internationally. Notably, no independent news sources in Myanmar mentioned AA involvement—only junta-affiliated media outlets did. Given the AA’s distant relations with the National Unity Government (NUG) in Myanmar politics, it is clear that the junta is attempting to connect two unrelated entities in a single narrative to send a misleading message to important neighbors like China.
Beyond this specific incident, a clear pattern emerges: the junta’s drug allegations closely correspond to periods of increased military pressure or losses inflicted by the AA and its allied forces.
A clear analysis of the timing of the drug allegations reveals that they are not random but are strategically deployed by the Myanmar junta in direct response to military losses and political pressures exerted by the Arakan Army (AA). This pattern indicates that the allegations serve as a form of "black propaganda" intended to tarnish the AA's image when the junta is failing to achieve success on the battlefield.
The following timeline demonstrates the direct correlation between these allegations and specific junta setbacks:
August 8, 2019: This allegation coincided with a period where the Myanmar military was losing ground and facing increasing military pressure from the AA in Rakhine State.
December 3-4, 2023: This was a particularly difficult time for the junta. The famous ‘1027 Operation’ had begun in northern Shan State in October 2023, and the AA joined the offensive on November 13. On December 4, the AA publicly announced it was intensifying attacks on junta positions in Paletwa.
March 6, 2025: By this date, the AA had already captured 14 of Rakhine State's 17 townships and was launching offensives into the Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady regions, as evidenced in their January 27 statement. The drug allegation at this time appears to be a reaction to these significant territorial losses.
April 26-27, 2025: This timing is not coincidental. It followed the AA's 16th-anniversary celebrations on April 10, which were acknowledged by congratulatory letters from at least 30 resistance groups. Furthermore, it came after a significant political milestone: on March 15, the UN Secretary-General, during a visit to refugee camps in Bangladesh, emphasized the need for dialogue with the ULA/AA. The junta's allegation is a transparent attempt to degrade the AA's growing international legitimacy.
July 8, 2025: This allegation, which claimed the AA was sponsoring PDF drug trafficking, was a clear effort to politically assassinate the AA's character. By falsely linking two unrelated entities (the AA and the PDF), the junta aimed to send a misleading message to international stakeholders, like China, in a "two birds with one stone" strategy. Notably, no independent national media outlets corroborated this story.
August 14-15, 2025: This period is highly significant. It followed the ULA/AA's 10th Press Briefing on August 10 and coincided with increasing international scrutiny over human rights issues. Most importantly, on August 5 and 6, the AA released video interviews of forcibly recruited junta soldiers defecting to their side—a morale-boosting propaganda victory that the junta sought to counter with defamatory drug news.
Please see the following table to see interrelations between junta propaganda and ground realities.
Junta’s Involvement in the Drug
As partly mentioned in the background section, the drug pandemic in Myanmar is nurtured and sponsored by the Myanmar military, which acts as a central institution, along with other proxy actors and forces like Border Guard Forces, people’s militias, and other junta-backed groups such as Pyu Saw Htee in central Myanmar. This has been especially evident since the military coup in 2021.
In this section, the study will focus on two sections of observations. First, it will uncover the involvement of Myanmar junta, its members and proxy actors in the drug production and trade and secondly, it will described credible international sources unearthed about it.
Evidence from Domestic Independent Media Outlets
Various domestic media outlets reported the involvement of the Myanmar military officials in drug trafficking in the country. For instance, before the military coup, on October 2, 2017, one source alleged that 2 Lakhs of WY drug found in the military truck driven by two logistic soldiers in Maungdaw township and these two soldiers are from No (808), Logistic Battalion in Buthidaung.
Three days later on October 5, media reported that police commander of No (1), Border Guard Police Force (BGPF), Thura San Lwin, was transferred to another location in Naypyidaw as Security Coordinator of No (1), Security Coordination Force. It meant drug found a few ago belonged to him but he was only transferred rather than punished.
Another incident took place on March 13, 2020 when the authority found narcotic drugs and weapons bearing the People's Militia emblem from the basement of a one-story house owned by U Wang Ta Jone, a member of People’s Militia from Loihkang Village, Kutkai Township, northern Shan.
After the military coup, records showed that there are at least 12 incidents in which whether junta senior personnel or people’s militia or its proxy actors are directly involved in drug trafficking.
For the purpose of clarity, the report will provide them in the following table;
Findings by Credible International Sources
Since before the military coup, the involvement of Myanmar military personnels in the drug trafficking was rampant. On January 8, 2019, International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that the ultimate authority over militias and paramilitaries involved in the drug trade, particularly in Shan State, and profits from their activities. It suggests that the military’s complicity creates a culture of payoffs and graft, undermining efforts to curb drug trafficking.
Then, this situation became wore after the military coup in 2021. On June 2, 2022, another research finding uncovered that Rakhine State serves as a drug transit hub and notes that drug lords pay corrupt authorities, including military officials, to facilitate trafficking. It mentions bribes paid to soldiers at checkpoints controlled by the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) to allow drug shipments to pass, particularly in border areas like Maungdaw. The article suggests a historical coexistence of the military and drug lords, with mutual profit from the trade.
This situation was confirmed by another finding in December 2022 which highlighted that the Myanmar military’s failure to effectively police drug trafficking post-2021 coup has allowed the trade to surge, with indications that junta-aligned militias, such as the Pyu Saw Htee, are directly involved in drug production to fund their operations. The article argues that the coup has created a “win-win” for drug cartels, with the military’s governance failures enabling unchecked trafficking.
While the military is not directly accused of running drug operations, its complicity lies in its inability or unwillingness to suppress trafficking, particularly in areas under its nominal control, and its alliances with militias engaged in the trade.
One culminating incident was reported in January 11, 2023 when the Reuters expressed that Thai police found $8.96 million worth of assets including luxury cars, watches and expensive bags, along with $239,091 in cash owned by Tun Min Latt, 53, when he was arrested in the Thai capital on September, 2022 along with three Thai nationals on charges of conspiracy to traffic narcotics and money laundering.
Tun Min Latt, who has interests in hotels, energy and mining, is a close associate of Min Aung Hlaing, and according to the Reuters, three sources with knowledge of the matter that he had procured supplies for the military and publicly available pictures showed them together at an arms fair in 2019.
Five months later, on June 30, 2023, credible sources exposed how Myanmar junta officials increasingly involved in drug trafficking after the military coup. It includes accounts from defectors like Lai Thang Mawia, who claimed a captain ordered him to transport heroin in army vehicles to Rakhine State, and Kapte Nginzakap, a former sergeant, who stated that some army officers in Kalay had “intimate links” with drug merchants. The article notes a surge in drug availability and new heroin variants since the coup, with accusations that military-aligned militias, such as the Pyu Saw Htee, are involved in opium transportation.
In 2025, there are still many accounts that evidently prove the Myanmar military’s direct or indirect involvements in drug production, trafficking and consumption. A source on January 1, 2025, claimed that the Myanmar military and its associated militias are involved in the drug trade, particularly in buying opium grown in areas controlled by other groups. It mentions former military pilots who claimed air force helicopters were used to transport methamphetamine and other drugs to cities and ports for overseas distribution, indicating high-level military complicity.
As the latest piece on June 15, 2025, analysts unearthed that the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) is deeply engaged in transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking, as a means to counter economic sanctions and sustain its power. This article argued that the junta views illicit economies as a “necessary evil” to generate revenue, with military elites directly benefiting from drug trafficking alongside other crimes like illegal logging and jade mining.
The military’s involvement in drug trafficking is part of a broader illicit economy that fuels Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis and political instability, with profits supporting military operations against resistance groups.
All these sources highlight the Myanmar military’s systemic role in enabling drug trafficking, either through direct involvement (e.g., helicopter transport, asset links to Min Aung Hlaing’s family) or indirect facilitation via militias like the Pyu Saw Htee, its allied ethnic armed groups, militia and BGFs. The Myanmar junta’s control over these groups, as noted in the International Crisis Group and T.wai reports, ensures profits flow to military elites.
In short, the junta's drug allegations against the AA are merely an attempt to diplomatically isolate the latter in regional relations, following repeated military losses on the Arakan front.
