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The Only Way for the Sustainable Solution of the ‘Rohingya’ Crisis: An Arakan Perspective
- globalarakannetwork
- Aug 5
- 4 min read
Updated: Aug 6
By GAN
Longread: Opinions August 5, 2025
The 'Rohingya' crisis has profoundly shaped Arakan (Rakhine State), intertwining ethnic complexities, security challenges, and humanitarian demands. With the United League of Arakan (ULA) and its armed wing, the Arakan Army (AA), having established significant control over Arakan since late 2023, a proto-state has emerged amid Myanmar’s civil conflict.
The three proposed solutions—curbing the militant activities of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), fostering border trade and humanitarian aid, and acknowledging ULA/AA authority while sharing the Bangagya (Rohingya) population burden through inclusive citizenship and integration in Cox’s Bazar—require careful consideration from the perspective of Arakan’s interests. This commentary examines these proposals, focusing on their implications for the stability, development, and self-determination of Arakan’s people.
Curbing Militant Activities of ARSA and RSO
Militant groups like ARSA and RSO pose significant threats to Arakan’s stability. ARSA’s attacks in 2016 and 2017 on Myanmar security posts and civilians triggered a military crackdown, displacing over 200,000 Bangagya and destabilizing the region. RSO’s resurgence after the 2021 Myanmar coup has fueled violence, including turf wars and criminal enterprises like drug trafficking, which disrupt efforts to maintain order in Arakan. These groups engage in forced recruitment, extortion, and violence, affecting both Rakhine and Bangagya communities and complicating governance in the region.
Bangladesh bears a critical responsibility to control these groups, as their operations in Cox’s Bazar refugee camps spill across the border. Recent actions, such as the arrest of ARSA leader Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi in March 2025, signal progress, but concerns persist about alleged Bangladeshi support for RSO to counter ARSA, which undermines regional security. Militant activities exacerbate ethnic tensions and provide Myanmar’s junta with excuses to interfere in Arakan, threatening the region’s autonomy.
A collaborative security framework between Bangladesh and Arakan authorities could dismantle these networks. Enhanced camp security in Cox’s Bazar, coupled with deradicalization programs, would reduce cross-border threats. Community-based initiatives engaging camp leaders could counter militant influence, but these must avoid alienating the refugee population, who may view such groups as flawed advocates for their rights. International support for counterterrorism and rehabilitation efforts is essential to ensure these measures strengthen Arakan’s stability without fueling further resentment.
Fostering Border Trade and Humanitarian Assistance
Promoting border trade and humanitarian aid aligns with the goal of revitalizing Arakan’s economy and fostering regional stability. Historically, Arakan and Bangladesh’s Chittagong region shared robust trade networks, creating a frontier culture that benefited both Arakan and Bengali communities. Controlled border trade could revive these ties, reduce dependence on illicit activities like drug smuggling, and generate economic opportunities for Arakan’s diverse population. Maritime and land-based trade routes, leveraging Bangladesh’s Chittagong port, could address Arakan’s isolation from mainland Myanmar, where junta blockades hinder development.
Humanitarian assistance is equally vital. Arakan’s disrupted supply chains have left civilians, in need of food, healthcare, and infrastructure. Aid channeled through Bangladesh could support schools, hospitals, and livelihoods, easing tensions over resource scarcity. For instance, international funding could bolster local governance efforts to provide services equitably across Arakan’s communities.
Challenges include Bangladesh’s economic limitations and domestic opposition to assistance which restrict cross-border initiatives. Within Arakan, equitable aid distribution is critical to avoid perceptions of bias toward any ethnic group. Transparent policies and international funding are necessary to develop trade infrastructure and ensure aid reaches all communities. Regional cooperation, potentially mediated by actors like China, could facilitate these efforts, provided they prioritize Arakan’s economic and social stability.
Acknowledging ULA/AA Authority and Establishing Inclusive Citizenship
Acknowledging the authority of the ULA/AA in Arakan would legitimize efforts to build a stable, self-determined region. The proposal to share the refugee population burden through “inclusive citizenship” on both sides of the border, alongside integration in Cox’s Bazar, offers a framework to address the crisis while balancing Arakan’s interests. The historical presence of Bangagya (Rohingya) with its cultural and linguistic ties to Cox’s Bazar, supports the homeland and citizenship concept, allowing Rohingya to reside in Arakan with defined rights, provided it aligns with a vision of a united Arakan.
Repatriation and citizenship for Bangagya are key demands, and acknowledging ULA/AA authority could enable negotiations to facilitate their return to original villages. However, internal challenges arise from some Rakhine communities’ concerns that Rohingya inclusion might dilute cultural identity. A phased repatriation process, starting with secure areas under ULA/AA control, could ensure Rohingya access to land and services, but requires careful planning to avoid conflict.
Integration in Cox’s Bazar, considered part of the Bangagya’s ancestral land, could alleviate pressure on Arakan’s resources. Programs like those in Bhasan Char, where 30,000 refugees access education and skills training, demonstrate potential for integration. However, Bangladesh’s repatriation efforts, driven by domestic pressures, risk returning Bangagya to unstable areas without guarantees of safety or rights. Arakan authorities advocate for a coordinated approach, with Bangladesh sharing the burden through integration and international actors supporting governance and development.
Significant obstacles include limited administrative capacity in Arakan and the need to balance ethnic group interests. International recognition and funding would strengthen efforts to implement inclusive policies. Dialogue with the community representatives is essential to define their status in Arakan, but Myanmar’s junta remains a barrier, opposing both ULA/AA authority and Bangagya rights. Regional frameworks, possibly involving ASEAN, could support cooperation, though geopolitical rivalries complicate progress.
Conclusion
The proposed solutions provide a pathway to resolve the Bangagya crisis while advancing regional stability and self-determination. Curbing ARSA and RSO activities is critical to ensure security, requiring Bangladesh’s cooperation and community engagement to prevent radicalization.
Border trade and humanitarian aid can revitalize Arakan’s economy and foster trust, but demand international support and equitable policies. Acknowledging ULA/AA authority and establishing inclusive citizenship, with integration in Cox’s Bazar, supports a balanced approach, provided it addresses for all communities’ needs.
Despite challenges—internal divisions, resource constraints, and junta interference—a commitment to dialogue and cooperation can pave the way for a sustainable solution that upholds Arakan’s future and the dignity of all its communities.
