RSO and Its Radical Islamic Agenda

GAN, Arakan (Rakhine State)

Special Report November 27, 2024

Chapter-II

A.  Ideology, Movements and Networks 

The development of radical Islamic ideology has been a global phenomenon in recent decades, and it has also impacted the Muslim community in Arakan. Since the formation of the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1974, its leader, Muhammad Jafar Habib, has advocated for international Islamic support for his militant movement, which operated from the Bangladeshi side of the border.

The Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami, founded in 1962 in Saudi Arabia, began providing support to the refugee population in Bangladesh in 1978. This wealthy organization was established to promote the message of Islam and combat perceived conspiracies against it. It built a hospital and a madrassa (seminary) in Ukhia, south of Cox’s Bazaar, to assist the refugee community.

a.     RSO and Its Radical Islamic Agenda

The RSO is a more radical Islamic militant group that broke away from the RPF in 1982, led by Muhammad Yunus. With its rigid religious ideology, the RSO quickly gained support from various Muslim groups with similar beliefs. Key ideological allies included Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) in Bangladesh and Pakistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami (HeI) in Afghanistan, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) in Jammu and Kashmir, and Malaysia’s Islamic youth organization, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM).

Reports indicate that Afghan instructors were seen at some RSO camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, and around 100 RSO militants were believed to be receiving training with Hizb-e-Islami Mujahideen in Afghanistan’s Khost province. This network of support highlights the RSO's regional connections and the broader alignment of militant Islamic movements with shared ideological or strategic objectives across South and Southeast Asia.

Similarly, Southeast and South Asian affairs expert Vaughn (2007) reported, based on a former Indian intelligence official, that HuJI (Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami) had provided training to Burmese Rohingya Muslims. It was also claimed that Al-Qaeda recruited Rohingyas from camps in southeastern Bangladesh, deploying them to conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya. A postdoctoral researcher, Alam (2008), found that Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJIB) established a network of madrasas in Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar in southeastern Bangladesh, some of which were reportedly used as sites for militant training. Additionally, HuJIB is alleged to have cultivated connections with Rohingya refugees in the region.

One research source in 2019 claimed;

“The Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), for example, is accused of having formed partnerships with Al-Qaeda and Jammaat-e-Islami among others. In addition, the interaction with the radicalized Saudi Arabia-based charity organization Rabita-al-Alam-al-Islami moved the RSO into the global stream of Islamic fundamentalism.”

The report continued by noting that certain factions within the Rohingya community are reportedly adopting a fundamentalist ideology aligned with banned Islamist groups such as Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). These factions are not only ideologically aligned but are also accused of actively participating in the training of members of these groups in the use of weapons and explosives.

Further reports suggest that these groups leverage global networks to secure financial support from sympathetic organizations, channeling these funds to strengthen their militant activities within Bangladesh. The use of international connections is raising significant concerns about the spread of militant influence within the Rohingya community and its potential impact on regional security.

The resurgence of the RSO in early 2021, after several years of dormancy, is particularly noteworthy. Credible sources indicate that the group is now supported by certain elements within the Bangladeshi security establishment. A Singapore-based research institute, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), has reported on this development, highlighting the potential implications for regional security;

“Mohib Ullah’s assassination and the death of the DGFI officer (by ARSA) eventually pushed Bangladesh to redirect its support towards the RSO, which has gradually increased its presence in and around the camps.”

The application of radical Islamic practices in the warzone by the RSO became more notable when the group mobilized to block Muslims in urban Maungdaw from fleeing the town, despite the looming conflict. The RSO's key objectives at that time seemed to be using the civilian population as human shields and manipulating the media and political landscape by maximizing civilian casualties in response to the Arakan Army's (AA) offensive.

The pamphlet in Figure-4 reads:

Figure-4

Notice for the Islamic Believers

1. Maungdaw is your town.

2. Allah does not permit you to leave the town.

3. Allah commands you to protect the town.

4. Heroes are near you, ready to protect the Islamic believers.

5. All Islamic believers are urged to unite in eradicating the enemy/evil.

Note: This chapter is part of the report titled "Growing Extremist Activities of Islamic Jihadist Groups in Northern Arakan," authored by GAN. The remaining parts and chapters will follow.