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Network of Drug Partners: Myanmar Navy, Bangagya Militant Groups Near Bangladeshi Water
- globalarakannetwork
- Sep 17
- 6 min read
Aung Naing Lin, Opinion
Global Arakan Network September 16, 2025
On September 15, 2025, Ramu Sector Commander Col. Mohiduddin Ahmed of Bangladesh's Border Guard (BGB) held a press conference at a Cox's Bazar hotel, accusing the Arakan Army (AA) of involvement in smuggling contraband yaba (methamphetamine) pills across the border. This marked a significant escalation in public rhetoric, with Ahmed linking the AA to a surge in seizures worth Tk 88 crore over two months, primarily via sea routes into Cox's Bazar.
Such claims are not isolated; Bangladeshi officials have echoed similar allegations since at least 2017, when the Department of Narcotics Control (DNC) highlighted yaba's devastating impact amid the Bangagya (Rohingay) influx. Early DNC estimates from that period suggested daily consumption of up to 2 million pills in Bangladesh, with Bangagya refugees increasingly drawn into smuggling networks tied to insurgents in Rakhine State, though direct AA links did not exist then as the group was not yet dominant at the border. Accusations persisted through 2022, 2024, and into 2025, often framing the AA as a key enabler of cross-border flows from Myanmar's Shan State production hubs.
Strikingly, even Myanmar's junta-aligned media has amplified these narratives, citing Dhaka's DNC reports to bolster claims against the AA. On August 29, 2025, state propaganda outlets referenced DNC data to portray the AA as a narco-terrorist entity, despite the irony of bilateral tensions over the Bangagya refugee crisis.
This alignment suggests a shared interest in delegitimizing the AA, which controls much of northern Rakhine and poses a direct challenge to the junta. However, DNC reports themselves often rely on Naypyidaw's accounts, creating a feedback loop of unverified intelligence. Successive Myanmar governments, starting from the 2011 quasi-civilian era, have weaponized drug allegations against the AA to undermine its Arakan national movement and erode public support.
These claims frequently align with political escalations; for instance, on September 12, 2025, junta airstrikes bombed Thayet Thapin village in Kyauktaw Township, killing 21 high school students in two private boarding schools, an atrocity condemned by UNICEF and the AA as targeting civilians. Just one day later, on September 13, state media announced the arrest of 16 suspects, including alleged AA members, in a bust of 5.4 tonnes of methamphetamine, ketamine, and heroin bound for Malaysia—valued at over 170 billion kyats—framed as evidence of the group's global drug syndicate.
Yet, questions persist about why Bangladeshi BGB and DNC officials continue to implicate the AA in trade routes to Bangladesh, especially when maps reveal most yaba flows from northern Shan State bypass sea routes in the Bay of Bengal. As Col. Ahmed himself noted, 80% of seizures occur via maritime paths along the Naf River, far from AA strongholds.
Possible motives include echoing junta narratives to pressure AA leaders on refugee repatriation and the release of detained Bangladeshi fishermen, or deflecting scrutiny from domestic enforcement failures and alleged complicity by BGB elements. Individual Rakhine gangs may participate in illicit activities, but extrapolating this to institutional AA involvement strains logic, particularly given the group's public denials and focus on anti-junta and anti-drug operations.
The sea-route patterns underscore this disconnect: Small fishing trawlers, often crewed by Bangagya disguised as civilians, ferry yaba hidden in fish hauls from Sittwe under cover of night, exploiting lax patrols. These consignments, produced in junta-influenced Shan labs, transit Myanmar navy checkpoints via bribes before crossing into Teknaf or Ghumdhum, where local dealers distribute inland.
Booming Drug Networks Involving Burmese and Bangladeshi Authorities
Reports from Bangladeshi and international sources reveal a pattern of complicity among Burmese military officials, including the Myanmar Navy and Border Guard Police (BGP), in facilitating the yaba trade into Bangladesh, particularly via the Naf River.
On January 12, 2020, a BGB raid seized 520,000 yaba pills worth $1.76 million from a boat in the Naf River, with smugglers escaping into Myanmar waters patrolled by the navy, suggesting either negligence or tacit approval by naval forces.
A 2018 Daily Sun investigation uncovered a "token business" where Burmese BGP and naval personnel issued passes to Bangagya smugglers for yaba transport in exchange for bribes, exploiting the porous border. The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) further notes that Burmese military officials, including those at naval checkpoints in Maungdaw, accept bribes to allow yaba from Shan State to cross into Bangladesh, with drugs often resurfacing in Sittwe. A July 2020 incident saw two Burmese soldiers arrested in Rakhine with nearly 2 million yaba pills destined for Bangladesh, underscoring direct military involvement.
International analyses and Bangladeshi media highlight systemic issues within Myanmar's military structure enabling this trade. A 2024 ResearchGate study details how military-affiliated Border Guard Forces (BGF), such as the Kokang BGF, facilitate amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) trafficking through Rakhine to Bangladesh, with naval oversight often compromised by corruption.
The U.S. State Department's 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report confirms ongoing complicity by Burmese military personnel in drug networks, including overlooking smuggling for bribes. On January 2, 2025, The New York Times reported that junta-aligned militias with naval ties smuggle yaba to destabilize Bangladesh’s borders, leveraging civil war chaos.
The Daily Star’s September 15, 2025, coverage of a BGB press conference linked a surge in seizures (2.8 million pills) to Tatmadaw facilitation, with 80% of coastal entries enabled by naval lapses. A 2023 UNODC report via ReliefWeb further notes that fragmented junta control, including inadequate naval patrols, allows unchecked yaba flows, exacerbating the drug crisis in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar region.
Patterns of Involvement by BGB Members
Involvement by some members of Bangladesh's Border Guard (BGB) in the drug trade point to localized corruption, though official narratives emphasize BGB's anti-smuggling operations. Investigations reveal a "token system" where individual BGB personnel along the Naf River accept monthly bribes (Tk 500-1,000) from Bangagya and Bangladeshi fishermen to allow yaba-laden boats to pass unchecked, often concealed in fish hauls.
A 2018 Daily Sun report referencing 2017 incidents described how BGB members issue "tokens" as safe-passage guarantees, enabling syndicates to offload drugs at Teknaf ports without interference. The Daily Star's 2023 coverage highlighted claims that some BGB units in Ghumdhum and Konapara overlook small smuggling vessels for kickbacks, contributing to the influx of yaba from Myanmar. A 2019 Dhaka Tribune article noted jurisdictional lapses where BGB released detained Myanmar nationals suspected of trafficking, indirectly aiding networks.
Further evidence of BGB complicity surfaces in reports of systemic vulnerabilities along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. A 2022 Daily Star investigation revealed that some BGB personnel at border outposts like Teknaf and Naikshongchhari were allegedly paid off by smuggling syndicates to ignore nighttime crossings, with Bangagya couriers exploiting these gaps to deliver yaba to Bangladeshi dealers.
The Dhaka Tribune's 2020 coverage of a smuggling bust suggested that lax oversight by certain BGB units allowed trawlers to unload drugs at coastal fish markets, implicating complicity in exchange for small bribes. Despite these issues, BGB's broader efforts—such as seizing over 9.2 million yaba pills in 2024 and 4.3 million in 2025 (up to September)—demonstrate a commitment to enforcement, with corruption appearing confined to isolated members rather than institutional policy. These incidents highlight the challenges of securing a porous border amid economic pressures and syndicate influence.
Drug and Militancy Cycle on the Bangladeshi Border
The porous border along the Naf River between Myanmar and Bangladesh has become a hotspot for illicit activities, where growing interactions between the Burmese Navy and Bangagya militant groups like the Arakan Bangagya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Bangagya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) are fueling an uptick in drug trafficking.
Reports indicate that Bangagya militants, often disguised as fishermen, exploit fishing trawlers to smuggle yaba from Myanmar's Rakhine State into Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar region. These disguises allow them to evade patrols while transporting consignments worth millions, with refugees from overcrowded camps serving as low-level couriers lured by payments of $10-20 per trip. Several sources have mentioned the junta and ARSA jointly trafficking narcotics to Bangladesh, using the proceeds to fund operations amid Myanmar's civil war.
An insidious profit pattern underpins these alliances: Burmese Navy and junta forces reportedly provide arms and ammunition to ARSA and RSO militants to launch attacks against the AA. In exchange, both navy officials and Bangagya groups engage in yaba sales, generating funds for further arms procurement and militant activities in Arakan. Captured junta soldiers have confessed to collaborating with ARSA to defend positions like Buthidaung against AA advances, supplying weapons to Bangagya fighters.
This quid pro quo has intensified since the 2021 coup, with drug cartels operating along the border facilitating the trade. Bangagya groups, facing existential threats from the AA's expansion, use these funds to sustain operations, including recruitment in Bangladesh's refugee camps.
Complicating matters, some hardline elements within Bangladesh's Border Guard (BGB) are allegedly complicit, motivated by financial gains from bribes and a strategic hope that heightened Bangagya militancy could pressure Myanmar for refugee repatriation. Reports of a "token system" suggest BGB personnel accept payoffs to overlook smuggling, enabling yaba inflows that fund militancy.
This pattern is evidenced by RSO's increased militant movements within Bangladesh and ARSA's cross-border attacks on AA posts from the Bangladeshi side, including clashes in Maungdaw Township that killed several ARSA members. Such activities have escalated violence in camps, with ARSA and RSO clashing over control while expanding recruitment.
Suspicion also lingers that some in Bangladeshi military intelligence may divert drug trade profits to arm and fund Bangagya militants, viewing them as proxies against Arakan's instability. Though unproven, these allegations align with broader concerns over Islamist funding networks in Bangladesh. This nexus poses a growing threat to regional peace, destabilizing borders, exacerbating the refugee crisis, and risking broader conflict spillover. International intervention is urgently needed to dismantle these alliances and curb the drug-militancy cycle on Bangladeshi border.
