How Myanmar Military Colludes with the Islamic Terror Groups

GAN, Arakan (Rakhine State)

Special Report November 30, 2024

The increasing terror activities of the ARSA against the refugee population in Bangladesh and growing hostile relations with Bangladesh's security agencies paved the way for the resurgence of the RSO. In January 2023, a nearly month-long fight between the two radical Islamic groups, ARSA and RSO, reportedly backed by Armed Police Battalion (APBn) and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), resulted in the supremacy of the RSO over the ‘No Man’s Land’ along the border with Arakan. Subsequently, while leaving some footprints in the refugee camps, the ARSA was forced to cross into Arakan, particularly in the northern Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, where the group attempted to restart its extremist activities.

The reign of terror on the refugee population became even more terrifying when these radical Islamic groups decided to collaborate and help their "once-old enemy," the brutal Myanmar military junta, in attacking the Arakan Army. It is not a shared identity or ideology but rather a common interest or threat that drives the collaboration between the Myanmar military and these Islamic groups. A marriage of convenience emerged when Myanmar military officials in Maungdaw and Buthidaung areas joined hands with these extremist groups—RSO, ARSA, and ARA—to hinder the offensive of the AA.

Step-1: Exchange for Money, Weapon and Life

Clear evidence of the ARA joining the Myanmar junta surfaced earlier. On February 4, 2024, when the Arakan Army (AA) attacked the junta’s positions at ‘Taungpro (Letwae/Letyar)’ near the Bangladesh border, members of the ARA cooperated with Myanmar soldiers in attacking the AA. A press release from the AA mentioned that ARA leader Nobi Hussian was tasked with purchasing weapons and ammunition from Myanmar’s Border Guard Police (BGP) for 10 million Taka. In exchange, he was expected to assist Myanmar BGPs in entering or escaping into Bangladesh. Nobi Hussian subsequently received a shipment of weapons and ammunition from the BGPFs via a truck, which entered from inside Bangladesh.

Step-2: More Military Pressure, More Recruitment

When the Arakan Army (AA) resumed its offensive attacks against the Myanmar junta in November 2023, the radical Islamic groups—RSO, ARSA, and ARA—seized the opportunity to gain profits amidst the conflict between the two warring factions. This time, however, they were now more than wanted by the Myanmar junta. In fact, as the AA launched its attacks on Rathedaung in late 2023, the Myanmar junta found itself desperate to halt the AA's advance toward the neighboring towns of Buthidaung and Maungdaw.

A captured major from the Myanmar military, Hlaing Win Tun, confessed in June 2024 that this situation prompted Myanmar junta officials to forcibly recruit, train, and arm around 750 Muslims in Buthidaung township, offering them the chance to collaborate with the ARSA and ARA. As the AA took control of Rathedaung on March 17, 2024, the collaboration between the Myanmar junta and these extremist groups grew more intense, and the junta increasingly tolerated their terror activities against the  civilains. A confidential video from March 28 revealed that the 352nd Light Infantry Battalion (LIB-352) had trained a group of Muslim youths in the school building at Tat Min Chaung, Buthidaung.

Step-3: More Recruits for Weapon and Training

Local sources on March 19, 2024, reported that around 100 members of ARSA and ARA, along with their leaders, crossed the Mayyu mountain range, heading to No. (5) Myo-Thu-Gree, a Border Guard Police (BGP) post. The purpose of their trip was to reinforce the Myanmar junta, joining the 400 members who had already arrived, bringing the total to 500. The political deal made during this meeting stipulated that the two groups would send more recruits from refugee camps in Bangladesh into the hands of the Myanmar junta. In return, ARSA and ARA would gain the right to rule Maungdaw township, with each group controlling half.

The meeting was attended by key figures, including Ataullah, Mustafar, and Kharlike from ARSA, along with Kabatular (Abdu Halim), Rafik, Amir, and two others. While it was unclear who represented the Myanmar junta, Brigadier General Thurein Tun, the commander of the Military Operation Command-15 in Buthidaung, was likely one of the participants.

This information was corroborated by a Bangladeshi media report. A report on April 7, 2024, confirmed the details of this political deal and the collaboration between the Myanmar junta and these extremist groups:

“In a recent development, Myanmar's military is reportedly leveraging former members of the ARSA and the ARA to bolster its forces in the ongoing conflict against the Arakan Army (AA) in Arakan State. Notably, Abdu Halim, a former ARSA operative, along with more than 40 individuals, has already joined a military battalion in Buthidaung. Additionally, around 200 members led by Ayoub, associated with the ARA faction, are preparing to enter Myanmar within the next few days.”

This report confirmed that Abdu Halim, Rafik, and Amir, who joined the meeting in No. (5) Myo-Thu-Gree, were the key individuals responsible for forcibly recruiting Muslim youths from the refugee camps. These individuals played a central role in facilitating the recruitment of new recruits for the ARSA and ARA groups, which were then sent to collaborate with the Myanmar military junta. Their involvement underscores the coordinated effort between these extremist groups and the Myanmar junta to strengthen their positions and control in the region, particularly in Maungdaw township.

Stept-4: The RSO Reached A Deal

The involvement of the RSO with the Myanmar junta became undeniable during the battle in Maungdaw in 2024. The collaboration between the two groups appears to have been initiated under the guise of religious propaganda. On May 12 and 13, a high-level RSO delegation from Bangladesh visited Maungdaw, where they met with Myanmar military officials. During this meeting, the RSO agreed to cooperate militarily with the junta, which included a demand to reopen the ‘Myoma Mosque,’ which had been closed since 2012. The visit was reportedly welcomed by some Bangladeshi media as a positive step for the Muslim community in Arakan.

The forced recruitment of refugee youths by the RSO reportedly began in early May. A report on May 6, 2024, stated that Ko Ko Lin, a key figure in the RSO, visited the refugee camps and instructed camp administrators (camp Majhi) to provide 5-10 youths from each camp for recruitment into the group. This marked a clear escalation in the group's activities, further solidifying their collaboration with the Myanmar junta.

The key victims of the opportunistic alliances between radical Islamic groups and the Myanmar junta are the refugee populations in Bangladesh and local Muslim residents in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. In May 2024, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that as many as 5,000 Muslim militants could be collaborating with the junta, recruited through both coercion and inducements from the refugee camps and within Arakan.

The forced recruitment of Muslim youths in the refugee camps has been arbitrary and concerning. On May 17, 2024, a local source reported that families were deeply worried about the involvement of camp authorities and security forces in this process. Journalists investigating the matter uncovered the methods behind this recruitment. It appears that the recruitment process is being carried out with the active participation of camp officials and local security forces, raising serious concerns about the exploitation and manipulation of vulnerable refugees for militant purposes.

“The RSO were directly handing people over to junta forces. Recruits going to Myanmar are overseen by Bangladesh’s DGFI and NSI until they cross the border. If the crossing is via the Naff River, then the Bangladesh Coastguard will also count them in. This applies to those joining the Myanmar military directly or joining RSO forces.”

Step-5: The ARSA Had Fully Joined

The ARSA leader, on May 20, 2024, mobilized his followers to attack the Arakan Army (AA), framing them as the sole enemy. In a video message that appeared to be filmed against the backdrop of a military building, potentially linked to the Myanmar military’s operations in Maungdaw and Buthidaung, the ARSA leader made this call to arms. Some observers on social media speculated that the video was recorded from the Myanmar military's ‘Myo-Thu-Gree’ or No-5 Border Guard Police base near Maungdaw.

The key components of the deal between the ARSA, other extremist groups, and the Myanmar junta involve these groups providing new recruits from the Muslim community to assist the junta in attacking the AA and bolstering Myanmar military positions. In return, Myanmar military officials may be willing to consider some form of power-sharing with these Islamic groups in the region. In the released video clips, several Muslim militants claimed, “The Burmese military has given us the northern Arakan areas,” indicating a possible agreement for the extremists to take control of these regions with the junta's backing.

 Step-6: Last Lost Battle

When the armed conflicts intensified near Maungdaw town, the RSO, which had mainly been cooperating with the junta in urban areas, controlled the gates and frequently threatened non-Muslim residents, such as Arakanese, Hindus, Mro, and others. During the intensifying conflicts, Ko Ko Lin of the RSO said on his social media account that "Maungdaw is now under our control." In September 2024, he admitted to collaborating with the junta, stating that the junta did not attack them and they did not attack the junta.

During the battle in Maungdaw, the RSO and ARA, due to their alliance, mainly resided in urban Maungdaw, whereas the ARSA forces were stationed on the outskirts of the town. When the battles for Buthidaung and Maungdaw were over, with the victory of the AA, those who were forcibly recruited or voluntarily joined were either killed, injured, captured by the AA, or escaped into refugee camps inside Bangladesh or Sittwe and Yangon under the facilitation of the junta authorities. However, one thing is very clear: the continuing and increasing suffering and misery for Muslim civilians due to the terrorist actions of the radical Islamic groups and state terrorism.

Note: This chapter is part of the report titled "Growing Extremist Activities of Islamic Jihadist Groups in Northern Arakan," authored by GAN. The remaining parts and chapters will follow.