How Bangladesh Has Involved In Northern Arakan Conflicts

GAN, Arakan (Rakhine State)

Special Report December 9, 2024

Bangladesh’s role in containing the spread of terror activities by radical Islamic groups is critical, involving information sharing, discouraging illegal activities, and joint border security cooperation. Since Bangladesh's independence in 1971, the border area with Myanmar has been marked by tension, standoffs, violence, and insecurity. Bilateral relations have primarily focused on the refugee crisis, illegal cross-border crimes, terrorism, and smuggling along the Naff River, rather than security, trade, and socioeconomic cooperation.

The 2017 refugee crisis further destabilized the border areas. Crimes, armed gang violence, and drug smuggling among the refugee community are increasingly concerning. Notably, radical Islamic groups have significant influence in the camps, with ARSA even referred to as the "night government." Since 2021, the resurgence of the RSO, reportedly backed by Bangladeshi security agencies, has escalated insecurity. These policies are at odds with a November 2017 agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar, under which Bangladesh committed to not hosting terrorists, insurgents, or supporting arms smuggling or human trafficking within its borders.

The close ties between Bangladeshi security forces, such as DGFI and BGB, and radical Islamic groups are no longer a secret. Bangladesh’s policy toward these groups can be seen as 'known toleration,' with some security policymakers viewing these groups as useful for advancing strategic objectives. For example, a 2023 research report indicated:

“Bangladesh’s support—both tacit and overt—for Rohingya armed actors has facilitated the rise of militant groups at the expense of moderate, non-violent Rohingya leadership.”

Initially, Dhaka tolerated ARSA’s presence in the camps, hoping it would support political objectives like repatriation. However, as ARSA began acting counter to its interests, Bangladesh shifted support to the RSO in early 2024 to counter ARSA. Yet, ARSA’s leader recently expressed gratitude to Bangladesh for hosting his people. Meanwhile, the RSO, now the de facto authority in the camps, has gained high-level access to Bangladeshi officials, such as in a May 12, 2024 meeting that included former and current foreign ministers and members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations.

In a further sign of collaboration, on May 15, 2024, a Bangladeshi news report praised the RSO for negotiating to reopen 'Myoma Mosque' with the Myanmar military. The report, presented in ‘standard Bengali language,’ aimed to portray the RSO as a defender of Muslim rights in Arakan. However, this shift highlights inconsistencies in Bangladesh’s policy. For instance, in early 2023, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense described the RSO as a criminal gang; within a year, they are now seen as government collaborators.

This policy shift raises questions about the involvement of security agencies like DGFI and BGB in the forced recruitment of refugee youths by the RSO and ARA, as these groups' recruitment efforts could not occur without government complicity. Alarmingly, some agencies appear to facilitate the transport of recruits by RSO and ARA for Myanmar junta forces in Arakan. During heavy fighting in Maungdaw, Bangladesh reportedly applied indirect pressure on the AA.

This short-sighted policy may stem from a belief that collaboration between Islamic groups and the junta could weaken the AA in northern Arakan and ease the refugee crisis. However, the outcome has been the opposite, with Bangladesh losing leverage and facing increased terrorist activity from RSO against the AA. Dhaka policymakers might think that RSO can be used as leverage in repatriation negotiations with the ULA/AA, but this strategy could backfire.

Continued RSO attacks from the Bangladeshi border risk escalating tensions between Dhaka and the ULA leadership. Although the Dhaka government may theoretically seek peace and stability along its border with Arakan, supporting the RSO and other armed factions against the AA risks creating further instability, jeopardizing the prospects for refugee repatriation in the foreseeable future.

Note: This chapter is part of the report titled "Growing Extremist Activities of Islamic Jihadist Groups in Northern Arakan," authored by GAN. The remaining parts and chapters will follow.