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By GAN
Shortread: Opinions January 3, 2025
In just 15 years since its establishment, the Arakan Army (AA), the Arakanese national military institution and the armed wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA), has seized control of at least 15 key township centers or key towns across Arakan. This leaves only three towns outside its control: Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State; Kyaukphyu, the second capital and host to multi-billion-dollar Chinese investments; and Man-Aung, a small, lesser-known island town.
The townships liberated by the AA include:
Northern Arakan: Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung
Central Arakan: Ponnagyun, Pauktaw, Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Paletwa, Mongbra, Myebon, Ann, Rambree
Southern Arakan: Taunggoke, Thandwe, Gwa
In terms of population and territory, the ULA/AA now controls over 90% of Arakan, which spans approximately 40,000 square kilometers and has a population of around 3 million. Globally, this size and population are comparable to countries like Moldova, Armenia, Albania, and Belgium.
By the standard definition of a state, modern Arakan meets the criteria of population, territory, and governance. However, it still lacks the characteristics of having established formal relations with other sovereign nations. This raises an essential question about the ULA/AA's role in addressing regional issues and advancing Arakan’s external position.
Assessing the Diplomacy of the ULA
Diplomacy, in essence, involves managing international relations and fostering dialogue between entities. Currently, Arakan still lacks official diplomatic representatives and formal trade relations with sovereign nations. However, as a de facto sovereign actor in Arakan, neighboring states like Bangladesh, India, China, and Burma are compelled to engage with the ULA government in political negotiations, conflict resolution, and public, economic, and cultural diplomacy.
Relations with Bangladesh
Three critical issues dominate relations between the Dhaka government and the ULA: the repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh, the armed activities of radical Islamic groups, and the restoration of trade and economic ties. For Dhaka, the primary concern is refugee repatriation, while the ULA leadership is principally focused on countering militant activities. Both parties, however, share an interest in reviving border trade and economic cooperation.
Some sources have accused Dhaka of supporting extremist Muslim militant groups such as ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) and RSO (Rohingya Solidarity Organization) to pressure the ULA into accepting its terms on refugee repatriation. Additionally, Bangladesh has reportedly leveraged border trade as a bargaining tool for repatriation demand.
If this is indeed Dhaka’s current policy, it should reconsider its approach toward Arakan. The Bangladesh government should cease its support for militant groups and focus on rebuilding trade relations to foster mutual trust and shared economic benefits. Following this, Dhaka could adopt a more pragmatic and sustainable approach to refugee repatriation, emphasizing trust-building and shared interests with the ULA leadership.
India
India, a regional power with deep-seated interests in Arakan and Myanmar, has always perceived China as its primary competitor in Myanmar’s security, political and economic landscape. Consequently, Delhi's foreign policy actions toward Myanmar are often seen as “reactionary” or “subjective” to Beijing’s initiatives. However, India faces growing challenges in safeguarding its national interests, such as completing the Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (Kaladan Project) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. India must adopt an "objective" approach to its goals and ambitions in Myanmar rather than focusing solely on competing with China—a contest it is less likely to win.
The Kaladan Project is a key issue in India-Arakan relations, but other matters such as regional security, stability in Northeast India, and countering Islamic radicalism in collaboration with the ULA government are also significant. Since the ULA has expressed openness to cooperation, the Indian government should prioritize resuming construction on the Kaladan project. This initiative would benefit not only India and Arakan but also other regional stakeholders, including Chin State and Burma side.
India’s concerns about ULA-China relations should not be viewed through a zero-sum lens. It is inaccurate to claim that the AA exclusively targeted Indian projects while sparing Chinese ones. For instance, while India’s projects in Paletwa were disrupted due to intense armed conflict, Chinese-invested areas like Ann Township also witnessed major clashes, such as the AA’s capture of the Western Regional Military Command headquarters. Delhi should decouple its perception of Arakan from its rivalry with China and instead focus on strengthening its direct relations and interests in Arakan. Clearly, the ULA is an autonomous agency that can determine for the best of its national interests in Arakan.
Beyond the Kaladan Project, fostering stability in Northeast India and combating Islamic radicalism are mutual priorities for Delhi and the ULA. In the past, India made a grave error by collaborating with Burma’s military intelligence to assassinate the former Arakan Army leader, General Khaing Raza, in the 1990s based on false allegations of arms trafficking to Northeast Indian militants. This act sowed distrust between India and the Arakanese people, serving the central Burmese government’s divisive interests. Now, India should learn from its mistakes and rebuild trust to promote stability in Northeast India. Beyond that, The ULA government could play a crucial role in supporting India’s Act East Policy.
Indeed, as it is said in the ‘Neighborhood First Policy’ of India, Arakan should be included in the priority lists for building infrastructure and providing assistance for community development and humanitarian causes.
Finally, with strained relations with both Pakistan and Bangladesh and the rise of Islamic militancy in the latter, India shares common ground with the ULA in countering these challenges.
China
China is often perceived as having stronger and more positive relations with the ULA leadership than other neighboring countries. As a great power, China’s regional ambitions focus on maintaining security and stability along its borders and within its project areas in Myanmar. Beijing has pragmatically engaged with any stakeholders supporting these objectives.
Following the ULA/AA's capture of more than 90% of Arakan, the ULA shares a similar priority: ensuring security and stability in Arakan, including the protection of Chinese investments such as oil and gas pipelines, deep seaports, and industrial zones in Kyaukphyu. As one of Myanmar’s poorest regions, Arakan could benefit from Beijing’s support for its development initiatives. The ULA could strengthen ties with China by fostering collaboration not only in foreign investments but also in rebuilding war-torn infrastructure, government capacity, and critical sectors such as health and education.
Strategically situated on the eastern bank of the Bay of Bengal and at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, Arakan could play a pivotal role in advancing President Xi Jinping's Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). According to one perspective, development serves as the foundation for security and civilization; security is necessary for development and civilization; and civilization enriches both security and development. These principles align with Arakan’s aspirations, positioning the ULA government as a key partner in bridging these global visions.
The West
The "West" in this context refers to a coalition of sovereign states, including the European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and the United States of America (USA). The West's policy toward Myanmar and Arakan is influenced by its geographical distance from Arakan, juxtaposed with proximity due to factors such as the humanitarian refugee crisis on the Arakan-Bangladesh border and the security implications of Chinese investments in the region.
While promoting democratic values and human rights in Arakan is not inherently a conspiratorial agenda, attempting to orchestrate a "color revolution" to install a pro-West government countering China would be counterproductive. Instead, viewing Arakan through a lens beyond "black-and-white" geopolitical ambitions could foster a win-win solution for both the ULA government and the West’s legitimate interests. More importantly, the ULA government in Arakan has always opened the door for collaboration in the spheres of emergency humanitarian assistance, community development, climate change, anti-transnational terrorism and global peace, etc.
Bite the Bullet!
After more than 200 years of absence, Arakan has just reclaimed its rightful place on the global stage. Just as contemporary analysts of international relations recognize the "return of the East" or the resurgence of Asia following two centuries of Western dominance as a natural social phenomenon, so too is the re-emergence of Arakan at the crossroads of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.
The guiding philosophy of the ULA/AA movement is the "Way of Rakhtita", which prioritizes the national interests of Arakan while fostering harmony with neighboring countries. The ULA’s ultimate goal is to establish an autonomous and sovereign Arakan with a "confederation status" in its relationship with other governments in the future “Union of Myanmar”.
The resurgence of Arakan after two centuries of subordination is not only an inevitable trend of history but also a reflection of the ULA's determination to build stronger relations with its neighbors and friendly nations worldwide. Thus, it is crucial for Arakan's neighbors to avoid being "naïve" or "locked" into rigid statist theories. Instead, prioritizing innovative and pragmatic approaches to align with Arakan’s national interests should form the cornerstone of their foreign policy strategies.
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