How An Insurgency Grows: Difficult Path Toward A New Dream

By Tun Oo and K Wantha, GAN

Longread: Opinions April 11, 2024

AA soldiers at the 5th anniversary (Photo/GAN)

The significance of the Arakan Army (AA) in Myanmar’s political landscape has been highlighted by the continuous military successes of Operation 1027 since October 2023. With the pause of fighting in the north-eastern Shan State, the military prowess of the AA has been further demonstrated with rapid and extensive victories in its homeland of Arakan.

With the 15th anniversary of its foundation on 10 April 2024, the AA, and its political wing of the United League of Arakan (ULA) have earmarked new ideological and organisational milestones in the political future of Arakan. Any revolutionary epoch in previous national liberation contexts involved a political movement shedding away the previous approaches and building on them to create a new historical paradigm. One key leadership excellence of the AA/ULA in bringing about its extraordinary successes within a short period has been its ability to create a new political epoch in the long national liberation history of Arakan. The AA/ULA has revolutionised the Arakanese revolutionary movement under the political ideology of the Way of Rakhita.

Building on this revolutionary political ideology, the AA/ULA has removed the previous narrow ethno-nationalist approaches, especially during the early years of its foundation, between 2010 and 2015. The misfired political transition of Myanmar during this period only crystallized its ideological, organisational, and political bases to propel the AA/ULA into the current political ascendency in Arakan as well as in Myanmar.

When the AA was formed in 2009, it might have been rooted in the long history of the Arakanese nationalist movement against the Burmese military rule and political suppression. However, it departed from the failures of these previous approaches to create new political aspirations in Arakan.  Especially the political developments in Arakan and Myanmar between 2010 and 2015 pivoted the AA/ULA to build a solid foundation for its political, organisational, and ideological agenda.

In electoral politics, Rakhine political parties had done relatively well in Rakhine State. In 1990, 2010 and 2015, the Rakhine political parties generally won quite handsomely. Especially in 2015, the Arakan National Party (ANP), formed as a united political front of two main parties of the 1990-based Arakan League for Democracy and the 2010-based Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, won the majority of the Rakhine State Assembly and a significant number of seats at the national level. Despite its electoral success, the elected Rakhine politicians were unable to lead any significant policy changes in their State. The ANP were not able to form the Rakhine State administration within the scope of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution, as the President appoints the provincial governments. Without any impact on the challenges faced by the local constituencies, the elected officials at the provincial or national levels became redundant. Their electoral successes had not turned them into champions for the aspirations of the ordinary people.

As the controlled transition of Myanmar occurred in the early 2010s, there was a buzz about the possibility of peace under a national ceasefire agreement. The Arakan Liberation Party, the then-longest ethno-nationalist Arakanese insurgency, signed the local peace agreement in April 2012, and it started to participate in national peace discussions. When the ALP delegation visited Yangon and Sittwe for the first time in April 2012, they were warmly welcomed by local Rakhine communities.

As the ethnic insurgency had almost disappeared from Rakhine State since the 1980s, the rebel soldiers were received with great enthusiasm. However, this earlier enthusiasm for the ALP quickly dissolved away as a handful of troops and limited the political capacity of the ALP fizzle into insignificance within a year or so. As a result, there was little impact on the wider ethno-nationalist aspirations from the ALP’s activities during this crucial transition period.

The 2012-13 communal conflict between the Buddhist Rakhine and Bangla-speaking Muslim communities also created a complex situation, especially for the Arakanese ethnonationalists. The international and external views on the Rakhine sentiments on the communal conflict are essentially the same as that of Burman Buddhist nationalism, such as those that gave rise to the MaBaTha and the 969 movements in other parts of Myanmar. Citing the violent threats—whether real or perceived— many Rakhines valued the protection provided by the Myanmar authority, especially its security forces. However, the 2012 communal crisis also impressed among Rakhines with the need for their potent armed forces which would protect their safety and ethnic interest.

As the national and international efforts to resolve the communal tensions emerged, many Rakhines felt they were excluded from these processes. As most international views on the communal conflict generally put Rakhines as perpetrators and in cahoot with the security forces, the Rakhine perspectives were generally not dismissed as being racist. Their accounts of being or feeling threatened by the communal conflicts were mostly disregarded or neglected.

As the international support focused on the immediate needs of the Muslim communities, Rakhine viewed that their development challenges can only be addressed by themselves. While the pan-Buddhist sentiment may have viewed the Burmese as friends in their conflicts with the Muslims, decades of economic exploitation and political repression of the Burmese authority, as manifested vividly in the Shwe Gas project, pushed Rakhines to seek a solution of their own.

How the AA Walked Through the Political Journey  

At the same time, the semi-civilian Thein Sein administration pushed for peace as one of its main reform priorities, resulting in both formal and informal discussions between Myanmar’s government representatives and all groups including the AA. Even from mid-2013, representatives of the then-nascent AA already visited Yangon to participate in various peace discussions. Despite limited or no presence in Rakhine State, the AA had already gained the reputation of being a relatively formidable and highly organised force.

The initial small group expended by mostly recruiting migrant workers at Kachin jade mines or Chinese businesses, while drawing material support from the established Rakhine community at the border. The AA as the youthful, articulate, and capable force demonstrated as a stark contrast to the ALP which is already a moribund force despite its long tradition. The images and videos of fully armed AA soldiers marching in large numbers created excitement among young people from the local communities in Rakhine State as well as migrant communities around the world. Despite its emerging popularity, the real impacts of the AA in Rakhine State were not felt until later well after the Arakan National Conference in 2014.

Arakan National Conference-2014 (Photocredit)

The Rakhine (Arakan) National Conference held in Kyauk Phru in April 2014 was supposed to have been a watershed moment for the Thein Sein Government in its relationship with the Rakhine community. Government officials and some Burmese political leaders attended the Conference along with the throng of various Rakhine delegations from all social and political constellations. However, the most significant delegation was the AA representatives led by its second most senior member, Nyo Twan Aung. Coincidently, as the native of Kyauk Phru, Nyo Tun Aung as the head of the AA delegation had various significances. Firstly, the dynamic images of youthful members led by a highly educated leadership of the AA contrasted with older Rakhine politicians with limited modern education. Secondly, the photo of Nyo Tun Aung meeting his mother at home in Kyauk Phru would have shaken the imagination of many Rakhines as the rightful return of the AA to its homeland, Arakan. Thirdly, Nyo Tun Aung as a native from the southern part of Rakhine State cemented the AA as a new Rakhine organisation that is no longer bounded by the traditional parochialism of the north-south political divide. While the Kyauk Phru Rakhine National Conference significantly increased the reputation of the AA. The AA delegation was viewed as a dynamic alternative to the existing organisations which were either ineffective or redundant in addressing the political and social problems Rakhines are facing.

In addition to the contextual conditions, the AA was also building its military and political importance over the period. As it was initially trained by and set up with support from the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the AA in earlier years was involved in supporting the KIO in its armed conflicts with the Tatmadaw. The AA cadets were among the 23 cadets killed at the KIA training academy by the Tatmadaw in November 2014. The AA expended its military alliance in 2015 when it joined the KoKang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) during its offensive in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. Through these new allies, the AA gained additional access to more sophisticated weapon markets, material support and political influence.

The increased reputation attracted more recruits to the AA, including those with already established profiles in the Rakhine political movement. The example of Khaing Thu Kha, a former senior leader of the ALP, joining the AA highlighted its new membership approach. As the bulk of the rank and file came initially from the workers who had already arrived at the border areas, the AA recruitment approach moved away from the network-based cadre approach of the previous insurgent organisations who used to look down on the migrant workers at the border areas. Viewing these migrant workers as fellow Rakhine essentially driven away from their homeland by colonial exploitation and political repression, the AA welcomed them with open arms. Its young and educated leaders of the AA represented a shift in the insurgent leadership from the monastic background of the ALP leadership. Furthermore, the eventual membership of the former ALP members such as Khaing Thu Kha and his current role as its spokesperson demonstrated the AA as a united organisation, which had been a great dream of Arakanese nationalists.

The ultimate capstone of all aspects of the AA/ULA in its journey to becoming the defining political force not just in Arakan and Myanmar is the political and ideological leadership of the Founder and Leader, General Twan Mrat Naing. The charismatic personality coupled with the political articulation of the AA Chief epitomises the leadership quality that inspires political inspiration in Arakan and even in broader Myanmar. Under his steady and constant leadership, the AA/ULA grew from strength to strength in these early years.

Unprecedented among the Arakanese organisations, the AA membership was the convergence of educated leaders with enlightened ideas of freedom and liberty; those with deep links to traditional organisations with a proud history of long-term commitments and other ordinary people who experienced the harshest impacts of the Burman monopoly on misrule. Building on this strong membership, coupled with the expanded political alliance and armed with the expanded arsenal of new weaponry, the AA members returned to their homeland to start their guerrilla warfare against the Burmese armed forces in 2015 and to start a new political epoch of national liberation. In less than a decade on this 15th Anniversary, the AA/ULA is on the verge of implementing the Way of Rakhita in Arakan and delivering realities to the Arakanese dreams of genuine political autonomy and national prosperity.