Extremism and the Security Balance along the Naf River

By Narameik Hla ၊ Opinion ၊ October 31, 2026

The notion that Islamic extremism and militancy are rearing their heads in Bangladesh under the new Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government led by Tarique Rahman has become a pressing topic of discussion among regional political analysts. This development brings numerous geopolitical challenges due to Dhaka’s policies and posture, affecting not only South Asian stability and security but also the Arakan Army (AA), which controls most of the Arakan region sharing a 271 km border with Bangladesh.

Former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina wrote in the New Delhi Post that present-day Bangladesh is leaning toward extremism and violent Islamism. She pointed out that the current government released leaders and members of terrorist groups, including Ansarullah Bangla, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Harkat-ul-Jihad, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. She added that a stable and democratic Bangladesh benefits both South Asia and the wider world.

According to Jama Uddin and Ali Asif Shawon writing in the Dhaka Tribune, during the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government on August 5, 2024, inmates escaped from Kashimpur High Security Central Jail across the country, many of whom were detained under anti-terrorism laws. Furthermore, news of Bangladesh Air Force officers being arrested due to connections with the domestic terrorist group Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), along with police warnings, serve as evidence of the rising influence of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh.

The fallout from this extremism crosses the Naf River boundary line, shaking and challenging the security balance of the Arakan region. While implementing local administration, the Arakan Army must simultaneously resist the Myanmar military on one front and combat Islamic terrorist groups such as ARSA and RSO on another.

For the Arakan Army, which is grappling with these multi-faceted challenges, the decline of democratic standards and the growth of extremism in Bangladesh are certainly no godsend.

Since the tenure of the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh has approached the Arakan Army with great caution.

Dhaka attempted to showcase a humanitarian corridor that was practically unfeasible on the ground and exerted harsh pressure on the Arakan Army regarding ethnic and refugee issues. It blocked border trade routes while turning a blind eye to ARSA and RSO recruitment drives inside the Cox’s Bazar refugee camps as well as their activities along the Bangladesh–Arakan border.

Under the new BNP government, internal political pressures and support from religion-based allies have led to a relaxation of strict crackdown policies against Muslim armed groups in border camps. This creates a breathing space for ARSA, RSO, and other factions, enabling them to expand connections with international terrorist networks beyond Bangladesh, rebuild their strength, conduct military training, and arm themselves more freely in the Cox’s Bazar camps and border jungles.

Funding flows under the guise of religious and humanitarian donations from the diaspora in the Middle East and Gulf states, alongside illicit support in technology, arms smuggling routes, and propaganda from the Myanmar military and certain international Islamic extremist organizations.

Gaining a foothold on the Bangladeshi side, these terrorist groups are increasingly likely to launch guerrilla attacks on Arakan Army outposts in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, plant landmines, and abduct or kill local residents. Furthermore, ARSA, RSO, and their supporting extremist factions could leverage religious and ethnic hate speech to incite refugees and Muslim residents in Arakan against the Arakan Army’s administrative mechanism.

Extremism severely undermines peaceful coexistence and trust-building between the Rakhine and Muslim communities, standing as the single largest obstacle to the peaceful coexistence and regional stability that the Arakan Army is striving to build.

Even if the BNP government wishes to negotiate with the Arakan Army to repatriate refugees, the influence of extremist groups within the camps could derail safe and formal repatriation plans, leading instead to increased illegal smuggling and violence along the border. To mitigate these issues, the new Dhaka government needs to enhance relations with the Arakan Army and share border security intelligence through both formal and strategic channels.

For its part, the Arakan Army must go beyond tightening border security militarily; it needs to effectively deploy community-based strategies to build trust with local Muslim residents, deliver humanitarian aid equitably, and counter the spread of extremism. Depending on its ground dominance, public support, and ability to maintain a strategic balance with neighboring countries like India and China, the Arakan Army must transform these challenges into opportunities for regional stability and the rule of law.