Chauvinist and Fascist Military: The Only Source of Instability and Insecurity in Myanmar
- globalarakannetwork

- Sep 13
- 5 min read
Updated: Oct 1
Kyaw Zan, Opinion
Global Arakan Network | September 13, 2025

The Myanmar military has been a central force in the country’s political and social landscape, casting a long shadow over its ethnic diversity and aspirations for democracy. The military’s chauvinist and fascist roots, its false claims of necessity in national politics, and its role as the primary driver of Myanmar’s ongoing turmoil are not only historical truths but lived realities for the Arakanese people.
The Myanmar military’s origins in chauvinist and fascist doctrines during World War II are a foundational truth that explains its oppressive legacy. Formed under Japanese influence in the 1940s, the Burma Independence Army (BIA), a precursor to the modern army, was shaped by ultranationalist ideologies that prioritized Bamar ethnic dominance and authoritarian control.
This chauvinism, rooted in a belief in Bamar superiority, marginalized ethnic groups like the Arakanese, who have distinct cultural, linguistic, and Buddhist identities tied to their historical Mrauk-U kingdom. Since the 1962 coup led by General Ne Win, this doctrine has been institutionalized through policies that suppress ethnic diversity, impose Bamar-centric governance, and militarize politics, leaving Arakan and other regions impoverished and disenfranchised.
The Arakanese have endured the consequences of this institutionalized chauvinism. The junta’s assimilationist policies, such as enforcing Burmese language in schools and sidelining Arakanese history, have eroded cultural identity. Economic exploitation, like the junta’s control over Arakan’s natural gas and fisheries, has left the region with poverty rates exceeding 70%, despite its resource wealth. The 2017 Bengagya crisis, driven by the military’s brutal campaigns, further destabilized Arakan, displacing communities and tarnishing the region’s global image. The AA’s rise, now controlling key townships like Buthidaung and Maungdaw, is a direct response to this oppression, aiming to restore Arakanese self-governance and cultural pride.
This chauvinist legacy also fuels distrust among ethnic groups. The junta’s divide-and-rule tactics, such as arming Bengagya Muslim militant groups to attack against Arakanese have sown discord, complicating social cohesion landscape. The Arakanese see the military’s fascist tendencies—centralized control, suppression of dissent, and glorification of violence—as antithetical to their vision of a federated, pluralistic Myanmar. By recognizing the military’s chauvinist roots, the global community can back ethnic national movements to dismantle its grip, enabling regions like Arakan to rebuild as stable, self-governing entities.
Problematic and Self-Serving Assumption
The Myanmar junta’s claim that its political dominance is necessary due to civil war is a self-serving falsehood that masks its role as the instigator of conflict. The junta argues that its control is essential to manage Myanmar’s ethnic insurgencies, yet the we could see the military itself as the primary cause of civil strife. By centralizing power, suppressing ethnic autonomy, and using violence to enforce Bamar dominance, the junta has provoked resistance from groups like the AA, which now governs much of Arakan. The Arakanese assert that professional militaries under civilian rule, as seen in democratic nations, can maintain security without meddling in politics, offering a model for a post-junta Myanmar.
The AA’s success in Arakan demonstrates that ethnic national forces can provide security and governance without replicating the junta’s authoritarianism. Controlling over 90% of Arakan by 2025, the AA has established local administrations, restored services like markets and security, and secured borders against junta incursions. Unlike the Myanmar junta, which uses air strikes and scorched-earth tactics, the AA operates under civilian oversight through the ULA, aligning with the Arakanese vision of self-governance. This contrasts sharply with the junta’s interference in politics, from the 1962 coup to the 2021 overthrow of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, which triggered nationwide resistance, beyond the Arakanese struggle.
Globally, examples like India or the Philippines show that professional militaries can combat insurgencies or external threats under civilian leadership without dominating politics. The Arakanese envision a similar model, where a federated Myanmar allows ethnic states like Arakan to maintain local armed forces for security while contributing to common national defense against the external threats. The junta’s claim of necessity is further undermined by its weakening grip, with losses in Arakan, Chin, and Kachin States exposing its inability to maintain control. By debunking the junta’s narrative, the Arakanese call for a Myanmar where ethnic regions govern themselves, free from the Myanmar military’s oppressive interference.
From an Arakanese perspective, the Myanmar junta’s megalothymia ideology—a sense of superiority and compulsion to dominate others— is the sole source of the country’s political turmoil and instability. This bullying mindset, rooted in Bamar chauvinism and fascist tendencies, has driven the military to suppress ethnic groups, crush democratic aspirations, and provoke widespread resistance.
The Arakanese, who have faced cultural erasure, economic exploitation, and violence under junta rule, see their struggle, led by the AA, as an unavoidable response to this oppression. The junta’s actions have not only destabilized Myanmar but also galvanized ethnic movements like the Arakanese to reclaim their autonomy.

The junta’s policies have directly fueled Arakan’s unrest. By prioritizing Bamar interests, the military has neglected Arakan’s development, leaving it with crumbling infrastructure and widespread poverty. Its divide-and-rule tactics, such as inciting Arakanese-Bengagya tensions or arming proxy Islamic militants, have deepened instability, as seen in the 2017 crisis and ongoing clashes in Paletwa.
The AA’s control over most of Arakan by 2025, including strategic areas like Paletwa, reflects a rejection of this bullying, with the ULA establishing governance that prioritizes local needs, such as Arakanese-language education and community markets. This contrasts with the junta’s reliance on violence, including air strikes that displace civilians, further destabilizing the region.
Many argue that the junta’s megalothymia has provoked responses from other forces, such as the Chin, Kachin, and Karen resistances. The AA’s alliances, like those with the Chin Brotherhood Alliance, demonstrate that ethnic groups can collaborate for stability, unlike the junta’s divisive approach. The military’s economic interests, such as controlling Arakan’s gas fields or profiting from projects like China’s Kyaukphyu port, further alienate locals, who see no benefits from their region’s wealth. The Arakanese vision of a federated Myanmar, where ethnic states like Arakan govern autonomously, offers a path to stability that counters the junta’s destabilizing ideology.
International support is crucial to end this turmoil. Sanctions on the junta’s economic assets, direct aid to ULA-administered areas, and diplomatic recognition of ethnic autonomy movements can weaken the military’s grip. For instance, funding for Arakanese infrastructure, like upgrading Sittwe’s port, could bolster local governance. The Arakanese also seek cultural support, such as UNESCO backing for Mrauk-U’s restoration, to preserve their identity against the junta’s assimilationist policies. By addressing the junta’s role as the source of instability, the global community can empower the Arakanese and other ethnic groups to build a stable, pluralistic Myanmar.




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